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ABSTRACT
We conjecture that a mutual fund manager with superior stock selection ability is more likely to benefit
from trading in stocks affected by information-events. Taking the probability of informed trading (PIN,
Easley, Kiefer, O'Hara, and Paperman, 1996) to measure the amount of informed trading in a stock,
and inferring mutual fund trades from a large sample of mutual fund holdings, we provide empirical
support for the conjecture. Funds trading high-PIN stocks exhibit superior performance on average,
and superior performance that is more likely to persist. The findings are not due to price momentum
or the higher returns earned by high-PIN stocks on average. Conclusions remain the same after testing
for alternative measures for the amount of informed trading. Decomposing a fund's stock selection
ability into "informed trading" and "liquidity provision" adds further insight into fund's underlying
strengths. Impatient informed trading is a significant source of alpha for funds trading high-PIN stocks,
while liquidity provision is more important as a source of alpha for funds trading low-PIN stocks.
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rjaganna@northwestern.eduAs of 2006, US mutual funds collectively managed $10 trillion, and almost $6 trillion of that in
equity funds. A signi￿cant portion of this amount is actively managed. According to a survey by
the Mutual Fund Institute, in 2006 alone, US mutual funds bought and sold common stocks worth
over $6 trillion. Over 1980 to 2006, investors paid at least 0:67 percent of portfolio value per year to
the active portfolio managers (French, 2008). Naturally, investors want to identify fund managers
with superior skills and to understand how these managers add su¢ cient value to justify their
fees. Ultimately, an active mutual fund manager￿ s success derives from his or her superior skill in
processing valuation-relevant information about a stock, a skill that should allow the identi￿cation
of potential mispricing. Thus, it is reasonable to expect such skills to be more valuable when stocks
the manager can invest in are a⁄ected by more value-relevant information events. To the extent
that rational managers have the option not to trade such stocks when they know that they do not
have an advantage in analyzing the information a⁄ecting a stock, we should expect to ￿nd that
managers who choose to trade in this case earn higher returns on average.
To examine this conjecture we need (1) a measure of the number of information events a⁄ecting
a stock during a given period; and (2) information that facilitates identifying a manager￿ s trades in
those stocks during those periods. We use the probability of informed trading (PIN) - proposed
by Easley, Kiefer, O￿ Hara, and Paperman (1996) - to proxy for the extent of information events
a⁄ecting a stock. We infer a mutual fund￿ s trades by comparing its quarter-end holdings with its
holdings at the end of the quarter before.
Using quarterly holdings data from 1983 to 2004 for a large sample of US active equity mutual
funds, we ￿nd that funds trading high-PIN stocks indeed outperform those trading low-PIN
stocks. That is, if we sort funds according to the average PIN of stocks they trade during quarter
t (de￿ned as trade_PIN), funds in the top trade_PIN decile outperform those in the bottom
decile by more than 50 basis points per quarter on a risk-adjusted basis during quarter t + 1. The
risk-adjusted performance does not depend on whether we adjust for risk using a factor model or
a holding-based characteristics model.
Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O￿ Hara (2002) document that high-PIN stocks earn higher returns ￿for
convenience we will refer to this phenomenon as compensation for PIN risk. Our ￿ndings, however,
are not driven by this phenomenon for the several reasons. First, we obtain very similar results
after we control for PIN risk when we examine risk adjusted-returns. Second, our conclusions do
1not change when we replace PIN with several alternative measures of the amount of information
a⁄ecting a stock. To account for the illiquidity associated with high-PIN stocks, we examine the
information asymmetry component of the PIN (adjPIN; see Duarte and Young, 2007). To ensure
that our results are not driven by the correlation between trading volume and PIN, we directly
examine abnormal turnover in stock trading (aturn; see Chordia, Huh, and Subrahmanyam, 2006).
We also consider the information asymmetry component of the bid-ask spread (theta; see Madhavan,
Richardson and Roomans, 1997) which captures the impact of information events on stock price.
Third, stocks recently bought by mutual funds outperform those sold by mutual funds, although
they have very similar PIN measures.
We ￿nd that the ability of trade_PIN to predict future mutual fund performance is not
driven by its correlation with other fund characteristics. In a cross-sectional regression framework,
trade_PIN provides additional explanatory power on the next-quarter risk-adjusted mutual fund
return even in the presence of many other fund level characteristics. We show that such predictabil-
ity is not due to potential momentum trading by mutual funds.
While fund managers who choose to trade high-PIN stocks on average outperform the rest,
we would expect outperformance to be concentrated among managers who in fact have superior
skills. Using a four-factor-adjusted fund return or alpha as a proxy for manager skill, we provide
supporting evidence for such conjecture. Sorting on trade_PIN variable generates signi￿cant
spreads in future fund performance only among funds with large alpha. In particular, amongst
funds associated with high alphas, only those that also trade high-PIN stocks during quarter t
produce positive and signi￿cant alpha of 33 basis points during quarter t + 1 after accounting for
fees and expenses. Moreover, to the extent that a manager￿ s skills are likely to persist for some time,
past superior performance is more likely to be an indication of future performance for a manager
who attained that performance by trading high-PIN stocks. Consistent with this conjecture, we
￿nd that sorting on fund alphas in quarter t within funds with high trade_PIN generates a much
wider spread in fund risk-adjusted returns in quarter t+1 (91 basis points on average). Controlling
for PIN risk does not alter our results in any signi￿cant way.
We also investigate the speci￿c channels through which a fund manager￿ s trades add value. In
general, how a manager with superior skill trades to add value will depend on how long it takes for
the market to realize that the manager is correct. Based on how long the informational advantage
2lasts, a manager￿ s trades can be classi￿ed into three types: long-term value investing, medium-term
informed trading, and short-term liquidity provision. Medium-term informed trading, in contrast to
long-term value investing and short-term liquidity provision, is likely to demand liquidity because
the value of information erodes quickly and the timely execution becomes important.
To attribute mutual fund performance to these di⁄erent styles of investment, we use a characteristics-
based performance measure, characteristic selectivity (CS), proposed by Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman,
and Wermers (DGTW, 1997).1 CS, computed using quarterly reported stock holdings by mutual
funds, measures the extent to which managers can select stocks that outperform the average stocks
with similar characteristics. Because mutual fund stock holdings data are available only at in-
frequent intervals (quarterly in most cases), it is di¢ cult to assess a manager￿ s skills when that
manager trades actively in between two holding reporting dates.2 We ￿nd nevertheless that a mu-
tual fund￿ s recent trades inferred from its quarterly holdings changes still reveals useful information
about how a manager adds value.
We decompose the CS measure for a given quarter into three components: (1) an old component
that captures value-added from the fund￿ s (previous) investments prior to the preceding quarter;
(2) a trade component that captures the value-added from the fund￿ s trades during the previous
quarter; and (3) a small adjustment component that results from preceding quarter￿ s net fund ￿ ow.
The trade component can then be decomposed further into an informed trading component and a
liquidity provision component. This latter decomposition is motivated by the evidence that stock-
level aggregate order imbalance serves as a good measure of the direction of liquidity needs on the
underlying stock (see Chordia and Subrahmanyam, 2004, among others). When managers trade
in the same direction as the aggregate market order imbalance on a stock, they demand liquidity.
Such trades are therefore likely to be driven by information and are classi￿ed as informed trading.
When fund managers trade in the opposite direction of the aggregate market order imbalance,
they e⁄ectively supply liquidity, and such trades are classi￿ed as liquidity provision. We validate
1We abstract away from measuring the market timing ability of mutual funds in this paper. See Ferson and
Schadt (1996), and Mamaysky, Spiegel, and Zhang (2007) for the discussion on empirical methods to detect mutual
fund market timing.
2For instance, Kacperczyk, Sialm and Zheng (2007) and Elton, et al. (2006) show that ￿unobservable￿actions (or
high-frequency turnovers) by mutual funds could be signi￿cant for some funds. Campbell, Ramadorai and Schwartz
(2007) attempts to infer institutional transactions within a given quarter by selecting trade sizes that best match
quarterly holdings changes. Relying on a unique regulation governing mutual fund trade disclosure in Canada,
Christo⁄ersen, Keim and Musto (2006) investigate essentially all trades of 210 Canadian mutual funds between 2001
and 2003.
3our decomposition approach by applying it to two speci￿c cases before applying it to portfolios of
active mutual funds sorted by the trade_PIN variable.
We ￿nd that a greater proportion of the CS measure for high trade_PIN funds (50 basis
points) comes from positions taken through trades made during the previous quarter; the trade
component is 31:2 basis points (t-value of 2:83). We also ￿nd that the stocks a fund bought as
well the stocks it sold had similar PIN values and both added value in the next quarter. Further,
we document that informed trading is more likely to add value when the fund is trading stocks
associated with more information events. The informed trading component in general increases
with trade_PIN, and is positive and signi￿cant (20:4 basis points with t-value of 2:25) only for
funds in the top trade_PIN decile. Liquidity provision, however, is more likely to be detected
when the fund is trading stocks associated with fewer information events. The liquidity provision
component is positive and signi￿cant (16:2 basis points with t-value of 2:57) only for funds in the
bottom trade_PIN decile, where the risk of adverse selection in trading is low.
Our results are relevant for two important strands of literature in ￿nance: the literature on mu-
tual fund performance, and the literature on market microstructure. The early literature on mutual
fund performance evaluation ￿nds that most managed portfolios earn close to zero or negative risk-
adjusted returns, especially after taking fees into account.3 This is consistent with Berk and Green￿ s
(2004) observation that competition among investors for a given supply of managerial talents of
fund managers will drive after-fee, risk adjusted performance to zero. More recent studies that use
of quarterly reports of mutual fund stock holdings ￿nd that active managers possess considerable
stock-picking abilities.4 On average, after adjusting for stock characteristics but before deducting
fees and expenses, stocks held by actively managed mutual funds outperform their benchmarks, and
stocks bought by mutual funds tend to outperform those sold by mutual funds. Further, several
mutual fund holding characteristics appear to correlate with better fund performance, including
funds that follow aggressive growth and growth styles (Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers,
1997); funds that hold the stocks of ￿rms whose headquarters are located geographically close to the
fund￿ s headquarters (Coval and Moskowitz, 2001); funds that have greater industry concentration
in their holdings (Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng, 2005); funds that have less diversi￿cation in their
3See Jensen (1968), Brown and Goetzmann (1995), Gruber (1996), and Carhart (1997).
4See Grinblatt and Titman (1989, 1993), Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers (1997), Wermers (1999), Chen,
Jegadeesh, and Wermers (2000), Sias, Starks and Titman (2006), and Schultz (2007)
4holdings (Baks, Busse, and Green, 2006); funds that show greater deviations from passive indexes
or greater proportions of ￿active shares￿(Cremers and Petajisto, 2006); and funds that have less
dependency on analyst recommendations (Kacperczyk and Seru, 2007). In addition, funds that
are smaller in size perform better after controlling for fund family size (Chen, Hong, Huang, and
Kubik, 2004).
We contribute to the literature by building on the insights in the market microstructure litera-
ture that trades reveal information associated with a stock, and that such information can help to
di⁄erentiate various trading motives and ultimately identify skillful managers. Moreover, as provid-
ing liquidity requires specialization and may well require a particular type of talent, we decompose
fund managers￿stock selection ability into a liquidity-demanding informed trading component and
a liquidity provision component. We believe that such a decomposition will help us better under-
stand the strengths of an active portfolio manager, and the extent to which such strengths will
continue to be of value in the future.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We describe our data sources and the sample
in section 1. We provide evidence that the amount of information events associated with stocks
traded by fund managers reveals their skills in section 2. We then show how to decompose the
stock selection ability of a mutual fund manager into its informed trading, liquidity provision, and
residual components in section 3. We conclude in section 4. Appendix A contain brief descriptions
on the various measures of information events we use. Appendix B illustrates our decomposition
approach with a numerical example and validates the approach empirically.
1 Data and Sample Construction
We use data from several sources. The mutual fund holding data are from the CDA/Spectrum S12
mutual fund holding database, which collects holding information from N30-D ￿lings with the US
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). A detailed description of this database can be found in
Wermers (1999). We exclude index funds from most of our analysis.5 Between 1983 and 2004, there
were about 11 domestic equity only index funds identi￿ed each quarter on average in the holding
database. Following the standard practice in the mutual fund literature, we also exclude all closed-
5Speci￿cally, we exclude a fund if its name contains any of the following: ￿INDEX￿ , ￿INDE￿ , ￿INDX￿ , ￿S&P￿ ,
￿DOW JONES￿ , ￿MSCI￿or ￿ISHARE￿ .
5end funds, international funds, sector funds, bond funds, and domestic hybrid funds (including
life-cycle and life-style funds), based on self-reported fund style in the CDA/Spectrum database.
Thus, we retain only those funds that self-report as aggressive growth (AGG), growth (GRO), or
growth and income (GNI). To ensure that the funds we examine are reasonably active, we examine
funds that traded at least ten stocks with a turnover of at least ten percent of its holdings during
the previous quarter. This ￿lter eliminates about ten percent of all fund/quarter observations.
Finally, we include only those fund/quarter observations for which the fund holdings at the end of
the previous two quarters are available, so that holding changes can be computed over consecutive
quarters. We obtain information on after-fee performance and other fund characteristics from the
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) Survivor-Bias Free US Mutual Fund database.
The CDA/Spectrum mutual fund holding data are matched to the CRSP Mutual Fund data
using the MFLINKS database developed by the Wharton Research Data Service (WRDS) and Pro-
fessor Russ Wermers. An appealing feature of the MFLINKS database is that it allows mapping dif-
ferent share classes of the same fund, which are recorded as distinct funds in the CRSP Mutual Fund
database, to the corresponding mutual fund holdings data in the CDA/Spectrum database. For
multiple share classes in CRSP that correspond to the same fund in the CDA/Spectrum database,
we aggregate returns of those share classes into one large portfolio￿ s return by equal-weighting or
value-weighting (using total net asset values). The results for equal-weighting and value-weighting
are similar, so we report the results for the former for brevity.
Stock data are from the CRSP. We include all common stocks (CRSP share codes 10 and 11)
traded on the NYSE, the AMEX, and the Nasdaq (CRSP exchange code 1, 2 and 3). Accounting
information is from the COMPUSTAT database. To link COMPUSTAT and CRSP, we use CRSP-
LINK produced by CRSP. The tick-by-tick stock transaction data are from the ISSM (1983 - 1992)
and TAQ (1993 - 2004) databases.
Overall, there are 4;654 distinct funds in our sample for the period 1983 through 2004. On
average, there are 701 distinct funds every quarter. The number of funds per quarter increases
from 134 in 1983 to about 1;700 toward the end of the sample, as shown in Figure 1. About 61%
of the funds in our sample are self-reported as growth funds; about 26% are reported as growth
and income (GNI); and the remaining 13% are reported as aggressive growth (AGG).
We collect two groups of fund-level characteristics for every quarter. First, we obtain common
6fund characteristics from the CRSP mutual fund database. These characteristics include: age (age
of the fund in months since inception, in terms of percentile rank in the cross section); turnover
(turnover rate of the fund); expense (expense ratio of the fund); TNA (total net assets under
management by the fund in millions US$); and pct_flow (net fund ￿ ows in percent, de￿ned as
TNA(t)￿TNA(t￿1)￿[1+Ret(t￿1;t)]
TNA(t￿1) ).6
Second, we aggregate stock characteristics at the fund level by value-weighting them for stocks
held by the fund using the quarter-end dollar values of the holdings. These characteristics include:
fund_holding (average percentage of total number of shares outstanding of stocks held by the
fund); fund_size (average market capitalization of stocks held by the fund, in billions of dollars);
fund_bm (average book-to-market ratio of stocks held by the fund); fund_mom (average past
one-year return on stocks held by the fund); and fund_amihud (average Amihud (2002) illiquidity
measure, in terms of percentile rank in the cross section, of stocks held by the fund).7
To evaluate mutual fund performance, we use both factor-adjusted returns and holding-based
characteristics-adjusted returns performance. Our ￿rst performance measure is based on the
Carhart (1997) four-factor model, which adds to the Fama-French three-factor model (1993) a
momentum factor. In particular, for each mutual fund each month, we estimate the following
rolling-window regression using monthly data from month (t ￿ 36) to (t ￿ 1):
Ri;t ￿ Rrf;t = ￿ + ￿1MKTRFt + ￿2SMBt + ￿3HMLt + ￿4UMDt + ￿i;t (1)
where Ri is the mutual fund i￿ s return after fees and expenses; Rrf is the risk-free rate; MKTRF is
the CRSP value-weighted market excess return over the risk-free rate; SMB is the small-minus-big
(SMB) factor; HML is the high-minus-low (HML) factor; MOM is the momentum factor.8
To ensure our estimation is relatively precise, we impose the constraint that there must be at
least 24 months￿worth of mutual fund return data available for estimation prior to month (t). That
is, we require the fund must have survived at least two years before we estimate the regression.
6We use percentile age ranks to remove a time-series (increasing) trend in the age variable.
7The Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure is de￿ned as the average ratio between absolute daily return and daily
dollar volume. We use percentile Amihud ranking for two reasons. First, there is a time-series (downward) trend in
the Amihud measure due to an increase in trading volume; and second, the Amihud measure may be extreme and
subject to outliers. Using percentile ranking alleviates these issues.
8The return factors are taken from the Kenneth French￿ s Web site:
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data Library.
7For month (t), we use the estimated factor loadings in the prior 36-month rolling window and the
current factor realizations to adjust the mutual fund excess return over the risk-free rate and obtain
the four-factor adjusted-alpha, or:
b ￿i;t = (Ri;t ￿ Rrf;t) ￿
h
b ￿1MKTRFt + b ￿2SMBt + b ￿3HMLt + b ￿4UMDt
i
(2)
We sum across the four-factor adjusted-alphas within a quarter to obtain the mutual fund￿ s quar-
terly four-factor adjusted-return.9
Our second performance measure is based on the mutual fund holdings. Daniel, Grinblatt,
Titman and Wermers (DGTW, 1997) and Wermers (2004) develop a characteristic selectivity (CS)
measure to detect whether managers are able to select stocks that outperform average stocks with
similar characteristics. We examine the actual stock holdings of the mutual fund and compute its




wj;t [Rj;t+n ￿ BRt+n (j;t)] (3)
where Rj;t+n is the return on stock j during quarter t+n; wj;t is the dollar value weight of stock j
held by the mutual fund at the end of quarter t; and BRt+n (j;t) is the benchmark portfolio return
during quarter t+n matching stock j at the end of quarter t according to its size, book-to-market
equity ratio, and past 12-month return.
2 Information Events and Mutual Fund Performance
An active mutual fund manager will be successful if he or she has superior skill in processing
valuation-relevant information on a stock, which helps the manager identify potential mispricing.
It is reasonable to expect that such skills add more value when stocks the manager can invest in
are a⁄ected by many value-relevant information events. Because rational managers can choose not
to trade such stocks if they do not have an advantage in analyzing information, we should expect
9We obtain the quarterly risk-adjusted return by aggregating the monthly risk-adjusted returns because the
regressions over quarterly return using the past three years of data have only 12 data points, making estimation
imprecise. This is also the approach used widely in the asset management industry (see, the Style Advisor￿ s User
Guide developed by Zephyr￿ s Associates).
8those managers who choose to trade them to earn superior returns on average.
To identify the occurrence of information events, we ￿rst make use of the Probability of Informed
Trading measure (PIN), which is a market microstructure-based measure developed by Easley,
Kiefer, O￿ Hara and Paperman (1996), and Easley, Kiefer and O￿ Hara (1997). In this model, there
are two types of traders: informed traders and uninformed traders. In the absence of information
events, only uninformed traders trade (primarily for liquidity reasons), and the order is equally
likely to be a buy or a sell, resulting in an order imbalance measure close to zero on average, and a
low PIN measure. On the other hand, when there are signi￿cant information events and informed
traders also trade, there will be large amounts of buy orders or sell orders (depending on the nature
of the information), resulting in a large order imbalance and a high PIN measure.10 Empirically,
PIN decreases with trading volume, size and analyst coverage, but increases with bid-ask spread,
and insider and institutional ownership, consistent with it being a reasonable measure of private
information events.
To estimate PIN, we use tick-by-tick transaction data for each quarter from 1983 to 2004,
employing the entire three-month data to ensure precision of the estimates. A breakdown of our
stock sample is provided in Panel A of Table 1. Overall, we have on average 4110 stocks with PIN
measures in a quarter. Due to data availability from ISSM, NASDAQ stocks enter the sample in
1987 and account for a large portion of the sample afterwards. The mean of PIN measures in
our sample is 25:8% with an associated standard deviation of 12:1%. The correlations between
PIN and other stock characteristics are tabulated in Panel B of Table 1. Consistent with Easley,
Hvidkjaer and O￿ Hara (2002), we ￿nd that high-PIN stocks are likely to be smaller and less liquid
stocks. There is also some positive correlation between PIN and book-to-market ratio.
In each quarter and for each fund, we then compute a trade_PIN variable by value-weighting
the PIN of stocks traded by the fund during the quarter using the dollar value of the trade.
Speci￿cally, we compute trade_PIN for the j-th mutual fund at the end of quarter t in our sample
10A more detailed description of the PIN measure and its estimation procedure is contained in Appendix B.
Recently, the PIN measure has been widely used in the empirical ￿nance literature, for instance, in Brown, Hillegeist










where PINi;t is the estimated PIN measure of the i-th stock traded by mutual fund j during
quarter t, and di;j is the absolute dollar value (using the stock price at the end of the quarter) of
the holding change during quarters t as reported by the mutual fund j. Intuitively, funds that buy
or sell more high-PIN stocks should have higher trade_PIN measures.
At the end of each quarter over 1983 - 2004, we sort all mutual funds in the sample into deciles
according to their trade_PINs and examine the four-factor adjusted and characteristics-adjusted
mutual fund portfolio return in the next four quarters after portfolio formation within each decile.
The results are summarized in Table 2.
The central message in Table 2 is that funds trading more high-PIN stocks outperform the
funds trading low-PIN stocks. Using the four-factor model for risk adjustment, we ￿nd that
funds in the top trade_PIN decile outperform funds in the bottom trade_PIN decile by 48 basis
points in the next quarter with a t-value of 3:15. The return spread is 46 basis points in the
second quarter with a t-value of 2:98. Return spreads are 35 basis points in the third quarter
(t-value = 2:24) and 35 basis points in the fourth quarter (t-value = 2:26). Thus, within a one-year
horizon after portfolio formation, funds within the highest trade_PIN decile outperform the funds
within the lowest trade-PIN decile by roughly 1:6 percentage points. In general, we see a positive
relation between future risk-adjusted fund returns and the trade_PIN variable: the lowest ￿ve
trade-PIN decile portfolios usually have large negative and statistically signi￿cant factor-adjusted
return during four quarters after portfolio formation; in contrast, the highest ￿ve trade-PIN decile
portfolios have small negative and in most cases statistically insigni￿cant factor-adjusted returns.
The results are similar for the characteristics-based risk adjustment. On average, the top trade-
PIN decile portfolio of funds outperform the bottom decile portfolio by 53 and 40 basis points per
quarter in the ￿rst and second quarter after portfolio formation. These di⁄erences are signi￿cant
at 1% signi￿cance level. The return spreads between the top and bottom deciles attenuate to 19
to 9 basis points in the third and fourth quarter.
10The factor-adjusted mutual fund returns di⁄er from the characteristics-adjusted mutual fund
returns in several important aspects. First, while the four-factor adjusted-returns are after fees and
expenses, the characteristic-adjusted returns are before fees and expenses. This di⁄erence explains
why the characteristic-adjusted returns are largely positive while the factor-adjusted returns are
mostly negative. Second, the characteristics-adjusted returns are calculated from the reported
mutual fund stock holdings at portfolio formation. Therefore, they do not account for the fact
that mutual funds can change their stock holdings afterward. Perhaps the best way to interpret
our characteristics-adjusted returns is to ask when the ￿mispricing￿at the stock portfolio level,
if any, dissipates. Interestingly, our evidence shows such dissipation occurs within two quarters.
Finally, unlike the factor-adjusted fund returns, the characteristics-adjusted fund returns ignore
possible cash, stock holdings below reporting threshold and other non-stock holdings of the mutual
fund. However, such holdings are usually small, accounting for less than 5% of the fund holdings
on average in our sample. In addition, factor-adjustment and characteristics-adjustment generate
similar return spreads between high trade_PIN fund and low trade_PIN fund deciles. These
results indicate that non-stock holdings by mutual funds are unlikely to introduce any systematic
biases.
2.1 Fund Characteristics
How can we tell which funds are more likely to trade high-PIN stocks? In Panel A of Table
3, we tabulate the average fund-level characteristics across trade_PIN-sorted fund deciles. All
characteristics are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to mitigate the e⁄ect of outliers. We
￿nd that high-trade_PIN funds are typically associated with smaller fund size, younger fund age,
higher expense ratio, and higher percentage fund in￿ ow. High-trade_PIN funds tend to hold more
stocks, and a greater amount of smaller and less liquid stocks. Their stock holdings as a percentage
of total number of shares outstanding are also higher on average. Finally, their investment style
more likely belongs to the aggressive growth or growth funds categories, compared to the low
low-trade_PIN funds, which lean more toward the growth and income.
Some fund characteristics have been documented as associated with superior fund performance.
For instance, Chen, Hong, Huang, and Kubik (2004) show that smaller funds are more likely
to outperform. Schultz (2007) documents that small growth stocks held by mutual funds produce
11abnormal returns on a characteristics-adjusted basis. The positive relation between the fund return
and the trade_PIN variable could be entirely driven by other correlated fund characteristics.
We examine this possibility in a cross-sectional regression framework. For each quarter in 1983 -
2004, we regress the next-quarter factor-adjusted or characteristics-adjusted fund returns on several
fund-level characteristics. All right-hand side variables (except the style dummies) are measured
as deviations from their corresponding cross-sectional means, standardized to have unit variance.
The regression intercept can be interpreted as the average e⁄ect of the growth and income (GNI)
fund style. Finally, the regression coe¢ cients are averaged across time, and the associated t-
values are computed using Newey-West correction with lag terms of eight quarters to account for
autocorrelations in the error terms. The regression results are reported in Panel B of Table 3. We
￿nd trade_PIN to be signi￿cant even with the presence of other fund-level characteristics.
2.2 Robustness
We consider two alternative explanations for the empirical ￿ndings in the previous section, and we
discuss them in turn.
PIN Risk?
Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O￿ Hara (2002) document that high-PIN stocks earn higher returns in
order to compensate the agents (including mutual funds) for the risk of trading with informed
traders. Since high trade_PIN funds may also hold high-PIN stocks, the high returns they earn
might simply be due to higher risk that is not captured by the four-factor model or the DGTW
benchmark characteristics risk adjustment.
To address this concern, we ￿rst directly control for PIN risk in the risk adjustment. In the
case of the factor-risk adjustment, we augment the benchmark four-factor model in (1) and (2) with
a PIN risk factor - PINt. Similar to Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O￿ Hara (2004), we construct the PIN
risk factor as the high-PIN decile portfolio return minus the low-PIN decile portfolio return. The
resulting ￿ve-factor-adjusted mutual fund return thus controls for any systematic PIN risk.
In the case of characteristics-based risk adjustment, we construct characteristics benchmark
portfolios by matching along size, book-to-market, past return, and PIN characteristics simulta-
neously. At the end of each quarter, we sort all stocks into 81 portfolios using a 3 by 3 by 3 by
3 sequential sort based their sizes, book-to-market ratios, past 12 month returns and PIN mea-
12sures (in that order). We then compute a new characteristics-adjusted fund return or characteristic
selectivity measure (CS￿) using the 81 benchmark portfolio returns in (3).
Both the ￿ve-factor-adjusted fund returns and the new characteristics-adjusted returns during
the next quarter in the trade_PIN sorted fund deciles are presented in the ￿rst two columns
of Panel A, Table 4. In general, the risk-adjusted fund returns increase with the trade_PIN
measure. Funds trading high-PIN stocks perform better than those trading low-PIN stocks, even
after directly controlling for PIN risk. The spread between the returns on the high-trade_PIN
funds and the low-trade_PIN funds, after directly controlling for PIN risk, narrows slightly but
remains positive and statistically signi￿cant. The ￿ve-factor alpha spread is 45 basis points per
quarter with a t-value of 2:85, while the new characteristics-adjusted return spread is 43 basis points
per quarter with a t-value of 2:11.
In a further check, we show that our results are robust to three alternative measures of the
number of information events. We describe these three alternative measures in Appendix A. The
￿rst measure we consider is the asymmetric information component (adjPIN) of the modi￿ed PIN
measure proposed by Duarte and Young (2007), which removes the illiquidity component of the
original PIN measure. Duarte and Young (2007) show that the pricing of PIN risk is driven by
the illiquidity component, while adjPIN is not priced in the cross-section. The second measure
is the information asymmetry component of the bid-ask spread (theta) as proposed in Madhavan,
Richardson, and Roomans (1997). In addition to causing large order imbalance, informed-trading
will also force the market maker to increase the bid-ask spread which can be captured by a higher
theta measure. Finally, assuming that signi￿cant information events usually lead to abnormal
trading in a stock, we use a measure of abnormal turnover (aturn) calculated following Chordia,
Huh and Subrahmanyam (2006).
To measure the average number of information events associated with stocks traded by mutual
funds during a quarter, we compute trade_adjPIN, trade_theta, and trade_aturn in the same
fashion as trade_PIN by replacing PIN with adjPIN, theta, and aturn in (4) accordingly. The
results appear in Table 4, Panel A.
We obtain very similar results for these alternative measures of the amount of information.
The next-quarter mutual fund risk-adjusted returns (using benchmark risk adjustment models) in
general increase with these alternative measures. In addition, funds trading stocks associated with
13more information events outperform funds trading stocks associated with fewer information events
by about 48 basis points per quarter, similar to the results using the original PIN measure. These
risk-adjusted return spreads are highly signi￿cant in the cases, and independent of whether we use
factor adjustment or characteristics adjustment to account for risk. The fact that we obtain very
similar results using adjPIN instead of PIN provides further support that PIN risk is not driving
our results.
Momentum Trading?
Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1995) document that the majority of mutual funds use mo-
mentum as a stock selection criterion, so momentum e⁄ects can signi￿cantly in￿ uence mutual fund
performance (see also Carhart, 1997). Panel B of Table 4 shows that funds trading high-PIN stocks
hold more recent winners than funds trading low-PIN stocks, resulting in a higher fund_mom on
average. A natural question arises: Could the di⁄erence in the CS measures between funds trading
high- and low-PIN stocks be driven by the momentum e⁄ect? We believe that the answer is no
for several reasons.
First, factor-adjusted and characteristics-adjusted fund returns are computed throughout after
adjusting for momentum e⁄ects. Second, when we regress the risk-adjusted fund returns on several
fund characteristics in a cross-sectional regression, we ￿nd fund_mom to be insigni￿cant, while
trade_PIN is still highly signi￿cant (see Panel B of Table 3), con￿rming that the higher return
associated with funds trading high-PIN is not driven by the momentum e⁄ect. Finally, we directly
examine the average past return characteristics of stocks bought, sold, and held by the funds
separately in Panel B of Table 4. In each quarter and for each fund, we ￿rst compute the value-
weighted average past one-year return of stocks in the ￿buy￿portfolio (stocks recently bought by
the fund), the ￿sell￿ portfolio (stocks recently sold by the fund), and the hold portfolio (stocks
held by the fund throughout the quarter). These past returns are then averaged across funds in
the same trade_PIN decile and across time. Although high-trade_PIN funds seem to buy more
recent winners than low-trade_PIN funds (the average past one-year return in the ￿buy￿portfolio
is 34.3% for high-trade_PIN funds vs. 20.9% for low-trade_PIN funds), high-trade_PIN funds
also sell more extreme recent winners at the same time (the average past one-year return in the
￿sell￿portfolio is 46.6% for high-trade_PIN funds); they thus are not momentum traders in the
traditional sense. In addition, funds in trade_PIN deciles 7 to 9 seem to buy or hold even more
14winners than funds in the top trade_PIN decile. If the momentum e⁄ect drives the high CS
measure, we would expect funds in trade_PIN deciles 7 to 9 to have higher risk-adjusted returns
on average. This is clearly not the case.
2.3 PIN and Fund Manager Skill
While fund managers who choose to trade high-PIN stocks outperform the other managers on
average, we would expect outperformance to be concentrated among managers who in fact have
superior skills. To test this conjecture, we use the four-factor-adjusted fund return or alpha as
a proxy for manager skill. At the end of each quarter from 1983 through 2004, we ￿rst sort
all mutual funds in the sample into three portfolios according to their alpha during the quarter.
Within the high alpha fund portfolio (top one-third) and the low alpha fund portfolio (bottom
one-third), we then further sort funds according to their trade_PIN variables during the quarter
into three portfolios. The average next quarter four-factor-adjusted and characteristic-adjusted
mutual fund returns are presented in Table 5, Panel A. We observe that funds with higher alphas
this quarter continue to perform better in the next quarter. Both the factor-adjusted returns and
the characteristics-adjusted returns are higher than returns of funds with low-alphas this quarter.
Perhaps more interestingly, sorting on the trade_PIN variable generates positive and signi￿-
cant spreads in future fund performance measures only among funds with high past alphas. Among
the funds with high alphas, those trading high-PIN stocks outperform funds trading low-PIN
stocks both during the current quarter and the next quarter. Their risk-adjusted return spread is
48 basis points (t-value = 3:64) based on factor-adjusted returns and by 43 basis points (t-value =
2:43) based on characteristics-adjusted returns. Funds associated with high alphas that also trade
high-PIN stocks produce positive and signi￿cant alpha of 33 basis points next quarter, even after
accounting for fees and expenses. In sharp contrast, among funds with low alphas, sorting on the
trade_PIN variable does not generate much dispersion in future fund performance measures at
all. In addition, during the current quarter, funds trading high-PIN stocks actually signi￿cantly
underperform funds trading low-PIN stocks, re￿ ecting the possibility that fund managers who are
overcon￿dent have more to lose in trading high-PIN stocks. Overall, these results provide addi-
tional support for our main hypothesis that skillful managers who can better analyze value-relevant
information can add more value when trading stocks associated with more information events.
15Panel B of Table 5 presents the results when we sort on trade_PIN ￿rst and fund alpha
second. We ￿nd that sorting on fund alphas this quarter for funds with high trade_PIN generates
a much wider spread in fund risk-adjusted returns during both this quarter and the next quarter
than within funds with low trade_PIN. Among funds that trade high-PIN stocks, funds that
earn higher quarter t alphas have higher quarter t + 1 alphas than funds that earn low quarter t
alphas (91basis points on average with t-value of 4:36), even after accounting for fees and expenses.
Among funds that trade low-PIN stocks, the quarter t+1 alpha spread between funds in the high-
and low-quarter-t-alpha groups is only 38 basis points. The t-value of 2.43 is also much smaller,
although still very signi￿cant. Results in Panel B suggest that past fund alpha does a better job
in separating talented managers from ordinary managers if we also examine the stocks they trade.
Table 5 also presents the risk-adjusted mutual fund returns after directly controlling for PIN
risk, and the results are very similar. Overall, the results indicate that talented managers indeed
add more value by trading stocks associated with more information events. The implication of this
￿nding is that analysis of the number of information events associated with stocks traded by the
managers helps us to identify the talented ones.
3 Decomposing Mutual Fund￿ s Stock Selection Skills
To better understand the channels through which talented fund managers can add value, we de-
compose the stock selection skill of a mutual fund. In general, how a manager with superior skill
trades to add value will depend on how long it takes for the market to realize that the manager is
correct. Analyzing how long the informational advantage lasts, a manager￿ s trades can be classi￿ed
into the following three types:
1. A manager can add value from long-term ￿value investing￿by taking a position in a stock
with the expectation that the market will eventually agree with his or her view in, say, a few
years.11
11Using fundamental analysis, Mario Gabelli, a money manager, realized that the stock of Hudson General Corp
(HGC) was heavily undervalued at around $25 in early 1994 and started to accumulate shares of HGC for his Gabelli
Funds (see Figure 2A). The investment paid o⁄ after two years, when the stock price reached $40. The market
eventually agreed with Mr. Gabelli, after Lufthansa took over HGC at $76 per share. See Greenwald, Kahn, Sonkin
and Biema (2001) for details on this case.
162. A manager can add value from medium-term informed trading by transacting in ￿mispriced￿
stocks, expecting the market to agree with his or her view within, say, a quarter or two.12
In this case, the value of the information is likely to erode quickly, and successful and timely
trade execution may require paying a substantial price concession.
3. A fund manager can add value using short-term liquidity provision by taking the other side
of a trade when liquidity is most needed.13 Since fund managers often hold an inventory
of stocks in order to track their performance benchmarks, they have a natural advantage in
making a market in those stocks. Superior knowledge about the stocks covered by a manager
will help in any market-making activities by minimizing potential losses that would arise from
trading with market participants with an information advantage.14
To separate the value-added in these three di⁄erent types of trading, we focus on the characteristics-
based performance measure, characteristic selectivity (CS). Recall that the CS measure of a mutual





wj;t [Rj;t+1 ￿ BRt+1 (j;t)]
where Rj;t+1 is the return on stock j during quarter t + 1; wj;t is the dollar value weight of stock
j held by the mutual fund at the end of quarter t; and BRt+1 (j;t) is the benchmark portfolio
12The year-to-year same store sales growth reported by Starbucks every month is a widely watched number, and
is considered about as important as the company￿ s quarterly earnings announcements for valuation purposes. For
January to September 2005, Starbucks￿reported sales growth rates were in the range of 7% to 9%. Most analysts
were of the view that a large part of that growth rate was attributable to the 3% sales price increase that took e⁄ect
in October 2004, and that this price increase would not help with respect to same-month year-to-year sales growth
rates beginning with October 2005. That probably explains the much smaller anticipated growth rate (analyst
consensus was 3.6%). However, a careful analysis of sales breakdown would have indicated that the 3% price increase
in October 2004 explained little of the sales growth during January-September 2005. So, the October sales growth
￿gure should be more like that for the early months of 2005. While most mutual funds decreased their holdings of
Starbucks stock during Q3 2005 in anticipation of an announcement of a drop in same-store sales growth for October,
Putnam Voyager Fund actually accumulated more shares (see Figure 2B). On November 3, 2005 Starbucks reported
unexpectedly strong sales growth of 7% for October, and its share price jumped. Details on this case can be found
in Blumenthal (2007).
13It is well known that when index funds trade following index rebalancing, their trades tend to demand liquidity
from the market (see Blume and Edelen, 2004). Active fund managers taking the other side of those trades will
bene￿t from liquidity provision.
14Sometimes managers may not be directly motivated by the ￿liquidity provision￿objective. For example, consider
a mutual fund with a policy of not investing more than a certain percentage of its assets in any one stock. The fund
may decrease its holdings of a stock that experiences a recent sharp price increase in order to satisfy its portfolio
weighting constraints. Such trades are likely to provide liquidity and will therefore be classi￿ed as ￿liquidity provision￿
even when liquidity provision was not the motivation behind the trade.
17return during quarter t + 1 to which stock j is matched at the end of quarter t based on its size,
book-to-market equity ratio, and past 12-month return.
We can further decompose CS measure. A numerical illustration of such decomposition is
provided in Appendix B. Suppose mutual funds rebalance only at discrete points in time, t = 1, 2,
3, ....,T. For convenience, we assume time periods are measured in quarters. Let Nt be a column
vector of mutual fund stock holdings (in number of shares, split-adjusted) at the end of quarter t.
By comparing Nt￿1 and Nt, we can de￿ne three stock portfolios:
1. Hold portfolio, which has stock holdings:
NH
t = min(Nt￿1;Nt)
where the operator min() calculates the element-by-element minimum; and NH
t captures
holdings that appear in both quarters.
2. Buy portfolio, which has stock holdings:
NB
t = Nt ￿ NH
t
The buy portfolio holds stocks bought by the fund during quarter t.
3. Sell portfolio, which has stock holdings:
NS
t = Nt￿1 ￿ NH
t
The sell portfolio contains stocks sold by the fund during quarter t.
Over time, the mutual fund stock holdings change as follows:
Nt = Nt￿1 ￿ NS
t + NB
t
Let Pt be a column vector of corresponding stock prices at the end of quarter t. Let us denote











At the end of quarter t, the mutual fund￿ s stock holdings are a combination of the hold portfolio
and the buy portfolio. The fund CS measure for quarter t + 1 is therefore the value-weighted








where CSH;t+1 and CSB;t+1 denote CS measure on hold and buy portfolios for quarter t + 1.






























The ￿rst component, the old component (CSO
t+1), can be interpreted as the CS measure on the
fund as if the fund did not balance its portfolio at all during quarter t. If nothing happens to the
fund during quarter t, its stock holdings would remain unchanged (Nt = Nt￿1), and thus would
be composed of stocks in the hold portfolio and sell portfolio. Consequently, the CS measure for
quarter t + 1 would be the value-weighted average of CS measures on the hold portfolio and sell
portfolios. Intuitively, this captures the value-added to the fund during quarter t + 1 from fund
investments prior to quarter t, and likely corresponds to the bene￿t from long-term investment.
The second component, the trade component (CST
t+1), measures the characteristics-adjusted
returns on the most recent mutual fund stock trades during quarter t. Finally, the adjustment
component (CS
adj
t+1) represents a small adjustment term whenever St 6= Bt, which could happen
19whenever there is in￿ ow or out￿ ow to the fund.
The trade component (CST
t+1) measures value-added from both medium-term informed trading
and short-term liquidity provision. Since mutual fund holdings are typically reported at quarterly
frequency at most, in order to make a reasonable attempt to separate them, we rely on a key
di⁄erence between these two types of trades. Informed trading, unlike liquidity provision trade,
is likely to demand liquidity since the value of information erodes quickly over time, so timely
execution becomes important. Given this intuition, we can further decompose the trade component
CST
t+1 into two components by comparing the sign of quarterly mutual fund holding change and
the sign of market order imbalance for each stock traded by the fund (the stocks in the buy or
sell portfolios) during quarter t. The market order imbalance is de￿ned as the total number of
buyer-initiated trades minus the total number of seller-initiated trades in the quarter.
Following custom in the literature, we implement the trade classi￿cation using the standard
algorithm in Lee and Ready (1991). We then classify stock trades where the two signs are identical
into one group, denoted by superscript ￿+￿ ; and where the two signs are di⁄erent into another
group, denoted by superscript ￿￿￿ . As a result, the characteristics-adjusted returns on trades from


































Given that the aggregate market order imbalance is a good measure of the direction of liquidity
needs of a stock, CS
inf
t+1 measures the characteristics-adjusted return on mutual fund trades that
on average absorb market liquidity (see Chordia and Subrahmanyam, 2004). Such trades are likely
driven by information and are therefore classi￿ed as ￿informed trading.￿CS
liq
t+1, on the other hand,
measures the characteristics-adjusted return on mutual fund trades that on average supply market
liquidity, and hence are classi￿ed as ￿liquidity provision￿ . In the extreme case where the fund
manager trades only one stock and when the time interval is one minute rather than one quarter,
CS
liq
t+1 will closely resemble the realized spread of Huang and Stoll (1996), which measures the













3.1 Discussion of the Empirical Implementation
There are several potential empirical issues associated with the implementation of our decomposi-
tion procedure. First, because we use quarter-end mutual fund stock holdings for the decomposition
of stock holdings, we will miss high-frequency turnovers by mutual funds; see Kacperczyk, Sialm
and Zheng (2007) and Elton, Gruber, Krasny and Ozelge (2006). To the extent that short-term
liquidity provision occurs within a calendar quarter, by using quarter-end holdings only, we may
underestimate the bene￿t from liquidity provision.
Second, the division of informed trading and liquidity provision is imprecise. On the one hand,
not all informed trading is liquidity demanding, especially when the trader is very patient and
trades in small quantities over a relatively long period of time. In the trading of relatively large
quantities quickly to take advantage of the time value of information, however, it is extremely hard
not to absorb liquidity. As a result, liquidity-demanding trades are still likely information-driven
on average. On the other hand, not all liquidity-demanding trades are information driven. For
example, distress stocks sales by mutual funds (see Da and Gao, 2006) and assets ￿re-sales due to
extreme ￿ ows (see Coval and Sta⁄ord, 2007) are likely to absorb liquidity but have nothing to do
with mispricing trading motives. As distressed stocks are typically of small market capitalization,
the impact of transactions will be alleviated, as each component of the CS measure is computed
using the value-weighted average. When we leave out value-adding informed trading that is not
liquidity demanding and including value-destorying distressed trading that is liquidity demanding,
we are underestimating the bene￿t of informed-trading, and overestimating the bene￿t of liquidity
provision. Finally, our classi￿cation of informed trading and liquidity provision depends on quar-
terly data, which could also be noisy. These noises may prevent us from ￿nding any signi￿cant
results.
21Recognizing these challenges in the empirical exercise, we have all the same made the ￿rst
attempt to bring both informed trading and liquidity provision into the evaluation of mutual fund￿ s
stock selectivity. In Appendix B, we examine several empirical properties of the decomposition
that lend support for its validity. First, we show that mutual funds are likely to provide liquidity
on average only when they reduce their holdings, consistent with our conjecture that it is easier
to provide liquidity on stocks that one currently owns. Second, we demonstrate the e⁄ectiveness
of our decomposition methodology using two speci￿c examples: (1) Dimensional Fund Advisors,
and (2) a group of domestic index funds. Third, we ￿nd that the informed trading component is
more important than the liquidity provision component in explaining cross-sectional variation in
the CS measures. In addition, informed trading becomes relatively more important for growth-
oriented funds while liquidity provision becomes relatively more important for income-oriented
funds, consistent with what one would expect.
3.2 Empirical Decomposition Results
We show for all US domestic active equity funds in the sample, the average size of each component
in the ￿rst line of Table 6. Overall, the active fund managers seem to have some stock selection skill
that requires trading with the order imbalance in the market. The average character selectivity
measure is 23.5 basis points per quarter (t-value = 1:91), indicating the stocks selected by fund
managers outperform stocks with similar characteristics. Of the 23.5 basis points, 13.9 basis points
come from the passive buy-and-hold strategy and 14.2 basis points come from stocks recently
traded by the funds. The adjustment component is small in absolute term (-1.8 basis points) but
signi￿cant, potentially driven by fund ￿ ow to managers with skills as empirically documented by
Chevalier and Ellison (1997), and Sirri and Tufano (1998), among others, and theoretically analyzed
by Berk and Green (2004).15 Finally, although both the informed trading component (CSinf) and
the liquidity provision component (CSliq) are positive, neither is signi￿cant.
Table 6 also shows the decomposition applied to the decile portfolios of funds sorted on trade_PIN.
This reveals interesting di⁄erences in value-added between funds trading high-PIN stocks and funds
trading low-PIN stocks. For high-trade_PIN-funds, a large part of the character selectivity (CS)
15When managers have skill (CS
P is likely to be positive), fund in￿ ow is more likely (B > S); when managers
have no skill (CS
P is likely to be negative), fund out￿ ow is more likely (S > B). Both e⁄ects lead to a negative
CS
adj as in equation (5).
22measure comes from active trading during the previous quarter (CST = 31:2 basis points with a
t-value of 2:83). We can con￿rm that the stocks bought by mutual funds (the buy portfolio) and
the stocks sold by mutual funds (the sell portfolio) have very similar average PIN measures. The
trade component, measuring their return di⁄erence, should be less subject to PIN risk. The fact
that it is positive and signi￿cant indicates that we are not capturing just the PIN risk. Although
both the informed trading component (CSinf) and the liquidity provision component (CSliq) are
positive for high-trade_PIN-funds, only the informed trading component is signi￿cant (20:4 basis
points with a t-value of 2.25), and it is twice the size of the liquidity provision component (10.4
basis points). This is consistent with our conjecture. When skillful managers absorb liquidity by
trading high-PIN stocks, they are likely to have valuation-relevant information, and thus make
money on informed trading. For them, there is less of an added cost of demanding immediacy
in the market than there is a bene￿t from superior information, as Grossman and Stiglitz (1980)
would predict. In terms of liquidity provision, not all of them can perform well consistently. As
a result, although the liquidity provision component is positive on average, it is much smaller and
not signi￿cant, perhaps because of the possibility of trading against informed traders and the noise
associated with identifying liquidity provision using quarterly mutual fund holdings data..
The low-trade_PIN-funds, despite near zero stock selection skill on average, seem to possess
some skill in liquidity provision. The liquidity provision component (16.2 basis points) is signi￿cant
(t-value = 2.57). This is because when fund managers trade low-PIN stocks, they are likely to
trade with uninformed traders. When they trade against market order imbalance, they are likely to
make money by providing the needed liquidity. Although the reward for liquidity provision on these
stocks is lower than that on the high-PIN stocks, the risk of adverse selection is also lower, making
liquidity provision more easily detected. The positive liquidity provision component is partly o⁄set
by a negative informed trading component, resulting in a close-to-zero CS measure.
To sum this up, the decomposition exercise reveals interesting patterns in how mutual fund￿ s
trades can add value. While informed trading is more likely to add value at times when the stock
traded are associated with information events, liquidity provision is more likely to add value (or be
easily detected in a statistical sense) when the stocks traded are associated with few information
events.
234 Conclusion
The folk wisdom is that portfolio managers can pro￿tably take advantage of their talent when
the stocks they follow are a⁄ected by information events. To the extent that economic conditions
that favor one type of talent over another tend to persist for a while, managers who were able to
generate value at a certain time will continue to do so for a while. It follows that the past superior
performance of a portfolio manager is less likely to be due to just plain luck when that superior
performance is attributable to trading in stocks that were most a⁄ected by information events.
We provide empirical support for this view. Funds that trade in stocks most a⁄ected by infor-
mation events on average earned 50 basis points per quarter more after risk adjustment than funds
trading in stocks least a⁄ected by information events. Among funds with a high positive alpha
in one quarter, only those that traded in stocks the most a⁄ected by information events earned a
signi￿cantly positive alpha (33 basis points per quarter on average) in the next quarter.
When we decompose a manager￿ s stock selection ability further into di⁄erent components,
we ￿nd that impatient informed trading is more important for alpha generation for the funds
trading stocks a⁄ected most by information events. Liquidity provision, on the other hand, is
more important for the funds trading stocks a⁄ected least by information events. Decomposition of
holding like this further facilitate the understanding of the strengths of an active portfolio manager
and the extent to which such strengths will persist into the future.
24Appendix A: Measures of Private Information Events
Easley and O￿ Hara with several coauthors develop a measure - probability of informed trading
(PIN ) - to capture the probability of information-based trading. Let ￿ denote the probability
that an information event occurs; ￿ denote the low value of underlying asset, conditioning on the
occurrence of an information event; ￿ the rate of informed trade arrivals; ￿b the arrival rate of
uninformed buy orders; and ￿s the arrival rate of uninformed sell orders.
Easley, Hvdkjaer, and O￿ Hara (2002) propose an maximal likelihood estimation of the parameter
vector ￿ ￿ f￿;￿;￿b;￿s;￿g



















where B and S represent total buy trades and sell trades for the day. The probability of information-
based trade, PIN, is
PIN =
￿￿
￿￿ + ￿b + ￿s
(A-2)











The problem with estimation of PIN measure is that numbers of buy and sell orders have risen
considerably since 2001, particularly for some Nasdaq stocks. One way to alleviate this problem,
as in Vega (2006), is to impose the constraint that the informed and uninformed orders arrive at
the same rate:
￿b = ￿s = ￿ (A-4)
Then we estimate a modi￿ed version of (A-1):
L(￿jB;S) = (1 ￿ ￿)e￿2￿￿B+S
B!S!
+ ￿￿e￿(￿+2￿)￿B (￿ + ￿)
S
B!S!









Note that the probability that an information event occurs (￿) and the rate of informed trade
arrivals (￿) enter the PIN equation as a product term (￿￿). Although ￿ and ￿ are estimated
individually rather imprecisely, because the estimation errors in the two parameters are usually
strongly negatively correlated, the resulting PIN estimate is quite precise. Moreover, the variation
in ￿ and ￿ are o⁄setting, making PIN a much stable measure bounded between 0 and 1.
In the economy of Easley, Hvdkjaer, and O￿ Hara (2001), the total number of trades B +S and
the order imbalance B ￿ S are related to parameters of the model. as:
E [B + S] = ￿￿ + 2￿
E [B ￿ S] = ￿￿(1 ￿ 2￿)
Since each day is either a good day (￿ = 0), a bad day (￿ = 1), or a no-event day (￿ = 0), the
expected daily absolute order imbalance (OIB) is then:
E [jB ￿ Sj] = ￿￿
Aktas, Bodt, Declerck, and Oppens (2007) and Kaul, Lei, and Sto⁄man (2007) show that a
relative order imbalance measure rel_OIB = E [jB ￿ Sj]=E [B + S] is a good approximation of
PIN. In fact, on a daily basis, rel_OIB is equivalent to PIN. In addition, the average cross-
sectional correlation between these two measures is above 0:75: rel_OIB is clearly a measure of
order ￿ ow one-sidedness. Our results are almost identical when we replace PIN with rel_OIB.
Durate and Young (2007) extend (A-1) to take into account large buy and sell volatilities, and
pervasive positive correlation between buy and sell orders. Their model allows the possibility of
order ￿ ow shocks and di⁄erent distributions of the number of the buyer-initiated informed trades
and the number of the seller-initiated informed trades. With such an extension, one may estimate
26an adjusted version of the probability of informed trading (AdjPIN) as
AdjPIN =
￿ ￿ [(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿b + ￿ ￿ ￿s]
￿ ￿ [(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿b + ￿ ￿ ￿s] + (￿b + ￿s) ￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿0 + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿
￿
+ ￿b + ￿s
(A-7)
where the additional parameter ￿ denotes the probability of symmetric order ￿ ow shocks conditional
on no arrival of private information event, and ￿0 denotes the probability of symmetric order ￿ ow
shocks conditional on the arrival of private information. ￿b and ￿s denote the additional arrival
rate of buy orders and sell orders conditional on the arrival of the symmetric order ￿ ow shocks.
Durate and Young (2007) simplify (A-7) by restricting ￿ = ￿0. The most important feature of
the model is the probability of symmetric order ￿ ow shocks could be non-negative (￿ ￿ 0). Since
we estimate the AdjPIN measure quarterly using the daily trade imbalanced data aggregated from
the tick-by-tick transactions, to reduce the sheer volume of calculations, and to estimate a relatively
parsimonious model with fewer parameters, we further impose the constraints that ￿b = ￿s = ￿
and ￿b = ￿s = ￿. According to Durate and Young (2007), the adjusted-PIN estimated with these
constraints generate similar results to their full-￿ edged model.
Thus, the adjusted-PIN measure we estimate is speci￿ed as:
AdjPIN =
￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ + 2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ + 2 ￿ ￿
In addition to causing large order imbalance, informed trading will also force the market maker
to increase the bid-ask spread. In the structural model of intra-day trading costs proposed by
Madhavan et al. (1997), the price change can be captured by:
pt ￿ pt￿1 = (￿ + ￿)xt ￿ (￿ + ￿￿)xt￿1 + ut
where ￿ is the market maker￿ s cost of supplying liquidity; ￿ captures the sensitivity of beliefs to
unexpected order ￿ ows or the degree of private information; xt is the sign of the order ￿ ow (1:
trade at ask, -1: trade at bid, 0: trade between bid and ask); ￿ is the autocorrelation of the order
￿ ow. theta (￿) is thus known as the information asymmetry component of the bid-ask spread and
serves as an alternative measure of private information events. ￿, ￿, and ￿ will be jointly estimated
with transaction-level data using the generalized method of moments (GMM) on a quarterly basis.
27To the extent that signi￿cant information events usually lead to abnormal trading in a stock,
our last alternative measure is a measure of abnormal turnover (aturn) calculated in a similar
fashion as in Chordia, Huh, and Subrahmanyam (2007). At the end of month t, for each stock, we
estimate a regression in a 36-month rolling window [t ￿ 35;t]:
turn = a + bx + "
where turn is monthly stock turnover de￿ned as the ratio between total number of shares traded
during the month and total number of shares outstanding, and x is a vector of adjustment regressors
including 11 monthly dummy variables for months (January - November) as well as the linear and
quadratic time-trend variables. The residual term for month t, "t, after standardization is the
measure of abnormal turnover (aturn).
Appendix B: Decomposition of Mutual Fund Stock Selection Skill - A Numerical
Example and Empirical Validations
B.1: A numerical example
Assume there are six stocks (A, B, C, D, E, and F). A mutual fund￿ s holdings in these stocks
at the end of quarter t ￿ 1 (Nt￿1) and t (Nt), stock prices at the end of quarter t (Pt), and the
characteristics-adjusted stock returns during quarter t+1 [Rj;t+1 ￿ BRt+1 (j;t)] can be summarized
in the following table:
Stock Nt￿1 Nt Pt Rj;t+1￿BRt+1 (j;t)
A 2 1 10 ￿3%
B 2 0 15 ￿2%
C 2 2 20 ￿1%
D 2 2 25 1%
E 2 3 30 2%
F 0 2 35 3%










A 1 0 1
B 0 0 2
C 2 0 0
D 2 0 0
E 2 1 0
F 0 2 0
Value Ht= 160 Bt= 100 St= 40
The portfolio values Ht, Bt, and St are determined using the prices at the end of quarter t
(Pt). Notice that Bt > St, and the di⁄erence is likely ￿nanced by fund in￿ ows, or a reduction in
cash position or the sale of other non-stock assets held by the fund. The hold, buy, and sell can
be treated as three separate funds whose CS measures can be computed using equation (3) and
holdings as:
Hold Buy Sell
CS CSH;t+1= 0:63% CSB;t+1= 2:70% CSS;t+1= ￿2:25%







1:42% 0:05% 1:49% ￿0:12%
If we further assume that the fund trades B and F in the same direction as the aggregate order
imbalance and trades A and E against the direction of aggregate order imbalance, equation (6)
further decomposes the trade component (CST
t+1) into an informed trading component (CS
inf
t+1)










B.2: Type of mutual fund trades and average order imbalances
29For active funds in our sample, we ￿rst examine their holding changes over two consecutive
quarters and categorize them into four groups: (1) open (holdings increase from zero to positive);
(2) close (holdings decrease from positive to zero); (3) increase (holdings increase but not from
zero) and (4) decrease (holdings decrease but not to zero). For each group, we then compute
the average dollar holding change as a percentage of the total dollar holding change of the fund
(computed using prices at quarter-end); and the average order imbalance measure. The average
order imbalance measure is de￿ned as the di⁄erence between total number of buyer-initiated shares
brought and total number of seller-initiated shares sold divided by total number of shares traded
during the quarter, the resulting number is then cross-sectionally demeaned. The associated t-value
is computed using the time-series average with Newey-West adjustment for autocorrelations.
The results are provided in Panel A of Table 7. The average order imbalance measure for each
trade type tells us whether the trade is on average demanding liquidity. When fund managers open
new positions and close out standing positions, they are likely to absorb market liquidity. In this
case, these trades are likely motivated by considerable mispricing perceived by fund managers who
are willing to pay for the price of immediacy. When fund managers adjust their holdings, they
are likely to provide liquidity on average only when they reduce their holdings, consistent with our
conjecture that it is easier to provide liquidity on stocks a fund currently owns.
B.3: Empirical decomposition examples
We demonstrate the e⁄ectiveness of our decomposition methodology using two speci￿c examples:
(1) Dimensional Fund Advisors, and (2) a group of domestic index funds.
Dimensional Fund Advisors (DFA)
Dimensional Fund Advisors (DFA) is an asset management ￿rm founded in 1981. It is well
known that the ￿rm does not use fundamental analysis to pick stocks, but instead helps its clients
gain exposure to certain segments of the asset markets through passive indexing or enhanced
indexing. Anecdotal evidence suggests that a subset of the funds managed by DFA create value
by systematically providing liquidity to those who want to trade small stocks for non-information-
related reasons.16
If this is the case, our decomposition procedure would allow us to ￿nd a positive liquidity pro-
vision component in DFA￿ s characteristic selectivity measure and an informed trading component
16See the case studies by Keim (1999) and Cohen (2002).
30close to zero. Of course, since we examine one speci￿c fund over a limited time period, statistical
signi￿cance could be rather weak.
We examine the quarterly stock holdings of DFA￿ s ￿ agship fund, US Micro Cap Portfolio, over
the period 1983 - 2004 and decompose its CS measure. The results are presented in Panel B of
Table 7. The overall CS measure for the fund is 36:1 basis points per quarter, but this is not
statistically signi￿cant (t-value = 1:72), indicating that the fund does not seem to exhibit any
ability to select stocks that outperform those with similar characteristics. As expected, the largest
component of the overall CS measure results from liquidity provision (20:5 basis points per quarter),
which is signi￿cant at the 10% level (t-value = 1:84). The informed trading component, however,
is very close to zero and statistically insigni￿cant, which is consistent with the claims of the ￿rm￿ s
investment policy.
Index funds
The majority of index funds are formed to track a market index or other broad index with the
objective of minimizing tracking errors, so we would not expect them to have a high CS measure.
Index funds are most likely to trade during index rebalancing and to demand liquidity in those
trades (see Blume and Edelen, 2004). These trades would be incorrectly classi￿ed as informed
trading within our decomposition framework, and the informed trading component, if di⁄erent
from zero, is likely to be negative. It is of course not useful to apply the decomposition to index
funds. For that reason we focus only on actively managed funds in the text, but examining index
funds provides another way to test the validity of our decomposition approach.
We identify index funds by their fund names as recorded in CDA/Spectrum S12 mutual fund
holdings database. Between1983 and 2004, there are an average of 11 domestic equity-only index
funds identi￿ed each quarter, starting from one fund each quarter in 1983 to about 25 funds each
quarter after 2000. Using their stock holdings, we apply our decomposition to each fund and then
equal-weight the results across funds for every quarter. These results are in the second part of Panel
B, Table 7. The overall CS measure for index funds as a group is almost exactly zero. The index
fund group has a positive although not signi￿cant CSO component of about 25 basis points per
quarter on average (t-value = 0.93), but this is not statistically signi￿cant. In addition, the index
funds on average make some pro￿t (although not signi￿cant) from providing liquidity, as evident
from a positive CSliq component of about 6 basis points per quarter (t-value = 0.36). Interestingly,
31the positive CSO and CSliq are o⁄set by a negative informed trading component (CSinf= -35 basis
points), which is statistically signi￿cant, indicating a sizable price for liquidity paid by the index
funds for trades that arise due to index rebalancing, new money ￿ owing in, and redemptions.
B.4: Variance decomposition results
To examine the relative importance of each component of the total characteristic selectivity
measure, we carry out a variance decomposition exercise. We decompose the total characteristic
selectivity measure into four components:17
CS = CSO + CSadj + CSinf + CSliq
Consequently, we have
var(CS) = cov(CS;CSO) + cov(CS;CSadj) + cov(CS;CSinf) + cov(CS;CSliq)
where var(￿) and cov (￿) are the cross-sectional variance and covariance, respectively. Dividing
both sides of this equation by var(CS), we then have
1 = ￿O + ￿adj + ￿inf + ￿liq.
The term ￿(￿) then measures the contribution of component (￿) to the cross-sectional variations
of CS. The sum of the contribution from the four components is equal to one by construction.
￿ can be measured by regression. For instance, ￿O is estimated by regressing CSO on CS cross-
sectionally.
Empirically, we have a panel data of cross-sectionally demeaned CS, CSP, CSadj, CSinf and
CSliq. To estimate ￿, we run a weighted least squares (WLS) regression. In practice, this means
de￿ ating the data for each fund-quarter by the number of funds in the corresponding cross-section.
The variance decomposition delineates how much the cross-sectional variation in the total CS
measure can be attributed to the cross-sectional variation in each of its four components.
The results are reported in Panel C of Table 7 for the full sample of all active US equity funds,
and across the three style subsamples. Overall, the old component (CSO) explains about 57% of the
17For simplicity of notation, we omit the time subscript t and fund superscript i.
32total cross-sectional variation in the total CS measure. The informed trading component (CSinf)
explains about 37% of the total variation, more important than the liquidity provision component
(CSliq), which explains slightly more than 8%. In addition, CSinf becomes more important for
growth-oriented funds, while CSliq becomes relatively more important for income-oriented funds.
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Figure 1: Mutual fund sample according to investment objective 
 
Index funds, lifecycle mutual funds, bond funds, hybrid funds, sector funds, and international 
funds are excluded. Only those funds that self-report as aggressive growth (AGG), growth 
(GROWTH), or growth and income (GNI) are included. Fund/quarter observations with quarterly 
turnover under 10% or under 10 stocks are excluded. Fund holdings at the end of the preceding 
quarter must also be available in order to calculate holding changes over consecutive quarters. 
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Figure 2: Share price and mutual fund holdings 
 
Pane A, Figure 1 plots the share price of Hudson General Corp (HGC) and Gabelli Fund’s 
holdings of HGC (as a percentage of total number of shares outstanding) from September 1990 to 
September 1998. Panel B, Figure 1 plots share prices of Starbucks (SBUX) from June to 
December 2005 (price is normalized so that the end-of-July price is 1) and Putnam Voyager 
Fund’s holdings of Starbucks (as a percentage of total number of shares outstanding) at the end of 
June, September and December of 2005. 
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B: Starbuck and Putnam Voyager Fund Holdings 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of PIN 
 
Probability of informed trading (PIN) is estimated at quarterly frequency over 1983-2004 using 
three-month trade and quote data from TAQ. Panel A describes the stock PIN sample over time. 
Correlations among PIN and other stock characteristics are reported in Panel B. 
 
Panel A: Summary statistics on PIN 
 
Year  # of stocks 
per quarter 
% of  
NYSE/AMEX
 stocks 
% of  
NASNAQ 
 stocks 
mean std  dev 
1983 1915  100.0%  0.0%  22.5%  10.2% 
1984 1747  100.0%  0.0%  25.2%  13.0% 
1985 1812  100.0%  0.0%  24.1%  11.8% 
1986 1828  100.0%  0.0%  23.4%  11.1% 
1987 3732  46.7%  53.3%  27.0%  12.1% 
1988 3399  50.0%  50.0%  28.1%  13.4% 
1989 3373  49.7%  50.3%  27.4%  13.3% 
1990 3321  49.4%  50.6%  27.7%  13.6% 
1991 3362  50.4%  49.6%  26.7%  12.7% 
1992 4117  43.4%  56.6%  27.2%  13.0% 
1993 4106  53.8%  46.2%  25.4%  12.0% 
1994 5258  36.3%  63.7%  27.4%  12.9% 
1995 5500  35.1%  64.9%  27.2%  12.5% 
1996 6028  33.7%  66.3%  26.6%  12.1% 
1997 6473  32.5%  67.5%  25.8%  11.8% 
1998 6453  32.6%  67.4%  25.6%  11.8% 
1999 5879  33.9%  66.1%  26.0%  12.1% 
2000 5526  33.1%  66.9%  26.3%  12.6% 
2001 4842  32.3%  67.7%  28.0%  13.6% 
2002 4476  36.4%  63.6%  25.3%  11.6% 
2003 3999  39.4%  60.6%  22.7%  9.8% 
2004 3727  42.0%  58.0%  21.1%  9.5% 
All 4130  51.3%  48.7%  25.8%  12.1% 
 
Panel B: Cross-correlation 
 
   PIN  log(Size)  log(BM) Momentum 
log(Size) -0.536      
log(BM) 0.169  -0.193     
Momentum -0.066  0.058  -0.148   
Amihud 0.557  -0.872  0.190  -0.198 
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Table 2: Risk-adjusted quarterly fund returns across trade_PIN sorted fund deciles 
 
In each quarter and for each fund, we compute a trade_PIN variable by value-weighing PIN of stocks traded by the fund during the quarter using the 
dollar value of the trade. At the end of each quarter from 1983 to 2004, we sort all mutual funds in our sample into deciles according to their trade_PINs 
and examine the risk-adjusted fund portfolio return in the next four quarters within each decile. We consider two methods for risk adjustment. The first 
method uses the Four-factor model (Fama-French three factors augmented by Carhart's momentum factor). The factor loadings are computed in a 
rolling window using fund returns during the past 36 months. The second method uses a characteristics-based risk adjustment. For each stock held by 
the fund at the end of each quarter, we compute its future excess returns over the returns of a characteristics-based benchmark portfolio that is matched 
to the stock along size, book-to-market and past return characteristics. These excess returns are then value-weighed across stocks at the fund level using 
dollar value of the stock holding to arrive at a characteristics-adjusted pseudo fund return. 
 
trade_PIN 
in Qtr t 
4-factor adj returns     Char-adj returns (CS) 
Qtr t+1  Qtr t+2  Qtr t+3  Qtr t+4     Qtr t+1  Qtr t+2  Qtr t+3  Qtr t+4 
Low    -0.0038 -0.0037 -0.0040 -0.0038   -0.0003 0.0004 -0.0002  0.0002 
  -3.45 -3.51 -3.45 -3.75    -0.29 0.42 -0.22  0.25 
2  -0.0040 -0.0039 -0.0044 -0.0033   0.0011  0.0015  0.0007  0.0005 
  -4.01 -4.34 -4.25 -3.47    0.92 1.40 0.70  0.52 
3  -0.0032 -0.0030 -0.0039 -0.0041   0.0012  0.0007  0.0007  -0.0003 
  -2.87 -3.03 -4.46 -3.81    1.04 0.74 0.72  -0.32 
4  -0.0031 -0.0036 -0.0037 -0.0037   0.0010  0.0012  0.0008  0.0000 
  -3.09 -3.66 -4.31 -3.38    1.01 1.19 0.84  0.01 
5  -0.0017 -0.0026 -0.0035 -0.0034   0.0029  0.0014  0.0006  0.0007 
  -1.57 -2.39 -3.24 -3.21    2.17 1.15 0.51  0.64 
6  -0.0027 -0.0017 -0.0019 -0.0031   0.0032  0.0023  0.0016  -0.0005 
  -2.18 -1.33 -1.36 -2.68    2.07 1.58 1.26  -0.37 
7  -0.0025 -0.0022 -0.0016 -0.0022   0.0028  0.0016  0.0016  0.0006 
  -1.80 -1.67 -1.24 -1.58    1.52 1.04 1.19  0.41 
8  -0.0019 -0.0003 -0.0008 -0.0018   0.0031  0.0024  0.0024  0.0014 
  -1.16 -0.22 -0.52 -1.14    1.73 1.41 1.53  0.85 
9  -0.0018 -0.0014 -0.0018 -0.0018   0.0035  0.0016  0.0006  -0.0004 
  -1.06 -0.82 -1.11 -1.18    1.75 0.84 0.35  -0.21 
High 0.0011  0.0009  -0.0005  -0.0003   0.0050  0.0044  0.0017  0.0011 
   0.85  0.67  -0.36  -0.21     2.70  2.75  1.20  0.68 
High-Low  0.0048 0.0046 0.0035 0.0035  0.0053  0.0040  0.0019  0.0009 
    3.15 2.98 2.24 2.26     2.87  2.55  1.29  0.52 
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Table 3: Fund-level characteristics and cross sectional regressions 
 
Panel A reports the average fund-level characteristics across the trade_PIN sorted deciles. Fund-level stock characteristics are computed by value-
weighing the stock characteristics of stocks held by the fund at quarter end using the dollar value of the holding. All characteristics are winsorized 
at the 1
st and 99
th percentile to alleviate the effect of outliers.  
 
Panel B reports the results of cross-sectional regressions. We regress the next quarter fund four-factor-adjusted return (alpha) or the 
characteristics-adjusted return (CS) on several fund-level characteristics in each quarter from 1983 to 2004. trade_pin is the average PIN of stocks 
recently traded by the funds; log_fund_size is the (log) average market cap of stocks held by the fund; log_fund_bm is the (log) average book-to-
market ratio of stocks held by the fund; fund_mom is the average past one-year returns on stocks held by the fund; fund_amihud is the average 
Amihud illiquidity measure, in terms of percentile rank in the cross-section, of stocks held by the fund; log_ TNA is the (log) total net assets under 
management by the fund; Age is the age of the fund since inception, in terms of percentile rank in the cross-section; expense is the expense ratio of 
fund; turnover is the turnover rate of the fund; dummy_growth is a dummy variable which assumes a value of 1 if the self-reported investment 
objective is “growth” and 0 otherwise; dummy_Agg is a dummy variable which assumes a value of 1 if the self-reported investment objective is 
“AGG” and 0 otherwise. All explanatory variables (except for the style dummy variables) are cross-sectionally demeaned and standardized so the 
corresponding coefficients can be interpreted as the impact on return of a one standard deviation change in the variable. Variables are winsorized 
at the 1
st and 99
th percentiles to alleviate the effect of outliers. Finally, the regression coefficients are averaged across time and the associated t-
values are computed using Newey-West corrections with 8 lags to account for autocorrelations in the error terms. t-values associated with the 
average measures are reported in italics.  There are on average 320 funds in each cross-section. 
 

























Low   64  11.2%  0.25%  32.9  0.56  0.232  4.5%  53.3% 0.680  1.14%  1020.9  2.74%  3.7%  50.9%  45.4% 
2 72  12.3%  0.26%  30.1  0.56  0.253  5.1%  55.3% 0.772  1.12%  972.5  2.11%  4.5%  54.1%  41.5% 
3 74  13.0%  0.27%  28.0  0.56  0.268  5.5%  55.9% 0.841  1.13%  848.4  1.98%  5.6%  54.9%  39.5% 
4 74  13.7%  0.28%  25.4  0.55  0.282  6.3%  54.2% 0.855  1.16%  740.8  1.95%  7.9%  60.4%  31.7% 
5 75  14.4%  0.32%  20.5  0.55  0.304  7.4%  53.8% 0.880  1.20%  719.1  1.82%  11.3%  61.5%  27.2% 
6 75  15.3%  0.37%  15.6  0.55  0.329  8.8%  50.8% 0.909  1.22%  636.8  2.42%  17.2%  59.7%  23.1% 
7  74 16.3%  0.44% 11.2  0.54  0.365  10.9% 48.1% 0.945  1.26%  557.5  3.23%  24.0%  59.8%  16.1% 
8 73  17.7%  0.54%  6.6  0.55  0.381  14.3%  45.3% 0.970  1.30%  404.4  2.85%  28.6%  59.6%  11.9% 
9 81  19.4%  0.63%  3.9  0.54  0.393  18.9%  42.6% 0.904  1.32%  353.9  3.92%  30.0%  61.8%  8.2% 
High 97  22.7%  0.91%  2.1  0.62  0.339 28.4%  37.6%  0.725  1.34% 295.1 5.29%  29.2% 64.9%  5.9% 
H-L  33  11.5% 0.66% -30.8  0.06  0.107  24.0% -15.7% 0.044 0.20%  -725.8  2.54%  25.5%  14.1%  -39.5% 
t-value  11.48 73.17  53.47  -9.76  3.05  6.19  47.36  -14.53 1.58 12.92  -14.94  4.59 13.74  7.50  -26.84 
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Panel B: Cross-sectional regressions 
 













LHS = Four-factor alpha in Qtr t+1 
coeff  -0.0037 0.0026 0.0016 -0.0008  -0.0013 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0004  -0.0014 0.0003 0.0011 0.0017  0.18 
t-value  -2.92 3.97 1.66 -1.21  -1.14 -0.21  -0.71  -1.86 -3.89  0.51  1.07 1.18    
LHS = CS in Qtr t+1 
coeff  0.0018 0.0020 0.0014 0.0006  0.0016  -0.0002 0.0000 -0.0001  -0.0004 0.0003 0.0006 0.0036  0.20 
t-value  1.25 2.79 1.42 0.52  1.69 -0.22  0.12  -0.64 -0.95 0.60 0.67 3.05    
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Table 4: Robustness 
 
Panel A first reports the next quarter PIN-risk-adjusted returns on decile portfolios of mutual funds sorted 
on  trade_PIN. To control for the systematic risk associated with high-PIN stocks, we compute a five-
factor-adjusted mutual fund return by augmenting the benchmark four-factor model with a PIN risk factor. 
The PIN risk factor is constructed as the high-PIN decile portfolio return minus the low-PIN decile 
portfolio return.  To control for PIN characteristics risk, we construct characteristics benchmark portfolios 
by matching along size, book-to-market, past return and PIN simultaneously.  
 
Panel A also reports the next quarter risk-adjusted returns on decile portfolios of mutual funds constructed 
using alternative measures of information events. These measures include: the information asymmetry 
component of the PIN (adjPIN, Duarte and Young, 2007); the information asymmetry component of the 
bid-ask spread (theta, Madhavan, Richardson and Roomans,1997) and the abnormal turnover in stock 
trading (aturn, Chordia, Huh and Subrahmanyam, 2006). Trade_adjPIN, trade_theta and trade_aturn are 
then computed in the same fashion as trade_PIN to measure the average amount of information events on 
stocks traded by the mutual funds.  
 
Panel B reports the average past one-year return of stocks bought / sold / held by mutual funds across 
trade_PIN sorted deciles. For each fund, we compute the value-weighted average past one-year return of 
stocks in the “Buy” portfolio (stocks recently bought by the fund), the “Sell” portfolio (stocks recently 
sold by the fund) and the “Hold” portfolio (stocks held by the fund throughout the quarter). These past 
returns are then averaged across funds and across time. t-values associated with the average measures are 
reported in italics. 
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Panel A: PIN-risk-adjusted fund returns and alternative measure of information events 
 
Portfolio 
Control for PIN risk     Alternative measures of information events 
Sorted on 
trade_PIN in Qtr t   
Sorted on 
trade_adjPIN in Qtr t  
Sorted on 
trade_Theta in Qtr t  
Sorted on 

















Low   -0.0034  -0.0008    -0.0033 0.0010    -0.0035 0.0005    -0.0045 0.0003 
 -2.97  -0.75    -3.20 0.79    -3.18 0.44    -3.46 0.20 
2 -0.0032  0.0010    -0.0034 0.0002    -0.0031 0.0022    -0.0031 0.0012 
 -2.98  0.79    -3.09 0.13    -3.11 1.71    -3.10 0.92 
3 -0.0026  0.0006    -0.0038 0.0010    -0.0029 0.0016    -0.0032 0.0021 
 -2.28  0.51    -3.44 0.79    -2.88 1.41    -3.18 1.78 
4 -0.0026  0.0014    -0.0035 0.0014    -0.0033 0.0011    -0.0035 0.0011 
 -2.57  1.10    -2.85 1.05    -3.64 0.97    -3.95 1.03 
5 -0.0012  0.0021    -0.0022 0.0033    -0.0029 0.0013    -0.0030 0.0010 
 -1.09  1.49    -1.86 2.26    -2.44 1.09    -2.82 0.85 
6 -0.0021  0.0028    -0.0011 0.0028    -0.0022 0.0020    -0.0024 0.0023 
 -1.60  1.63    -0.88 1.81    -1.81 1.26    -1.98 1.55 
7 -0.0019  0.0032    -0.0019 0.0030    -0.0017 0.0030    -0.0026 0.0016 
 -1.28  1.59    -1.33 1.85    -1.18 1.84    -1.76 0.99 
8 -0.0019  0.0022    -0.0015 0.0039    -0.0006 0.0049    -0.0007 0.0055 
 -1.05  1.23    -1.02 2.05    -0.39 2.55    -0.53 2.97 
9 -0.0015  0.0019    -0.0012 0.0037    0.0002 0.0043    -0.0008 0.0031 
 -0.86  0.88    -0.81 2.16    0.14 2.17    -0.50 1.60 
High 0.0011  0.0035    0.0015 0.0058    0.0006 0.0055    0.0004 0.0051 
   0.86  1.97     1.14 3.13    0.40 2.70     0.29 2.56 
High-Low  0.0045 0.0043    0.0048 0.0048    0.0041 0.0050    0.0049 0.0048 
2.85 2.11     3.13 2.97    2.48 2.66     2.70 2.23 
 
Panel B: Average past one-year return of stocks bought / sold / held by mutual funds across trade_PIN 
sorted deciles 
 
trade_PIN  Past One-year Return     
Buy Sell Hold  Buy-sell  t-value 
Low 20.9%  24.3% 22.2% -3.4%  -5.74 
2 23.2%  26.4%  24.6%  -3.2%  -5.18 
3 25.1%  26.8%  25.6%  -1.7%  -2.96 
4 26.7%  29.6%  27.2%  -2.9%  -4.08 
5 28.5%  32.1%  29.2%  -3.6%  -4.48 
6 32.1%  36.2%  32.4%  -4.1%  -3.66 
7 36.2%  39.6%  35.2%  -3.4%  -3.13 
8 39.2%  43.8%  37.5%  -4.6%  -3.60 
9 40.2%  46.1%  37.8%  -5.9%  -4.65 
High 34.3%  46.6%  34.0%  -12.3% -8.93 
H-L  13.47% 22.36% 11.73%     
6.37 8.42 6.47       
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Table 5: Persistence of mutual fund returns and trade_PINs 
 
At the end of each quarter from 1983 to 2004, we conduct three by three double sorts based on trade_PINs and four-factor alphas of the mutual 
funds. We then report the next quarter risk-adjusted returns on different mutual fund portfolios constructed by the double sorts. For benchmark risk 
adjustment, we use both the four-factor model and the characteristics model for risk adjustment. To control for the systematic risk associated with 
high-PIN stocks, we compute a five-factor-adjusted mutual fund return by augmenting the benchmark four-factor model with a PIN risk factor. 
The PIN risk factor is constructed as the high-PIN-decile portfolio return minus the low-PIN-decile portfolio return.  To control for PIN 
characteristics risk, we construct characteristics benchmark portfolios by matching along size, book-to-market, past return and PIN simultaneously.  
t-values are reported in italics. Panel A reports the result on a double sort where we sort on mutual fund return alpha first and trade_PIN second. 
Panel B reports the result on a double sort where we sort on trade_PIN first and mutual fund return alpha second. 
 
























  High alpha, Qtr t (top 1/3): 
Low  0.1261 0.0279 0.0183 -0.0015 0.0013    0.0283 0.0188 -0.0013 0.0004 
  62.63 19.07 11.89 -1.07  0.88    18.21 11.17 -0.95  0.24 
Medium  0.1535 0.0329 0.0236 0.0003 0.0031    0.0333 0.0244 0.0008 0.0027 
  71.92 19.50 11.59  0.20  1.64    19.79 10.57  0.47  1.25 
High  0.2011 0.0365 0.0273 0.0033 0.0056    0.0365 0.0264 0.0034 0.0045 
  88.08 22.59 11.52  2.10  2.33    23.12 11.25  2.10  1.93 
High - Low  0.0750 0.0086 0.0090 0.0048 0.0043    0.0082 0.0075 0.0047 0.0041 
     11.25  5.30 3.64 2.43    9.73 4.47 3.43 2.15 
   Low alpha, Qtr t (bottom 1/3): 
Low  0.1245 -0.0331 -0.0150 -0.0062 0.0004    -0.0325 -0.0160 -0.0052 0.0000 
  62.81 -24.67 -14.92 -4.56  0.33    -23.34 -15.82  -3.63  -0.03 
Medium  0.1509 -0.0377 -0.0185 -0.0041 0.0026    -0.0370 -0.0198 -0.0038 0.0016 
  70.51 -24.78 -12.90 -2.71  1.64    -22.62 -13.76  -2.34  1.08 
High  0.1965 -0.0408 -0.0202 -0.0048 0.0009    -0.0404 -0.0229 -0.0044 -0.0008 
  86.80 -26.08 -11.88 -2.66  0.46    -24.00 -12.82  -2.26  -0.38 
High - Low  0.0720 -0.0077 -0.0052 0.0014 0.0005    -0.0080 -0.0069 0.0008 -0.0008 
    -9.72  -3.58  0.89  0.30    -8.81 -4.58 0.49 -0.39 
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Panel B: Sorting on alpha among mutual funds with high and low trade_PINs 
 
 






















  High trade_PIN funds, Qtr t (top 1/3): 
Low  0.1957 -0.0420 -0.0211 -0.0050 0.0009    -0.0416 -0.0236 -0.0047 -0.0007 
  89.49 -23.56 -11.83 -2.68  0.43    -22.50 -12.75  -2.36  -0.34 
Medium  0.1970 -0.0014 0.0030 0.0001 0.0043    -0.0015 0.0021 0.0000 0.0032 
  89.49  -1.07 1.82 0.05 2.31    -1.00 1.12 -0.03 1.65 
High  0.1983 0.0397 0.0298 0.0040 0.0058    0.0397 0.0287 0.0044 0.0046 
  91.68 20.61 11.73  2.44  2.33    20.83 11.38  2.55  1.90 
High - Low  0.0025 0.0816 0.0509 0.0091 0.0049    0.0813 0.0523 0.0091 0.0054 
   2.81   21.93  4.36  2.27    30.75 21.88  4.17  2.36 
   Low trade_PIN funds, Qtr t (bottom 1/3): 
Low  0.1231 -0.0314 -0.0141 -0.0054 0.0005    -0.0307 -0.0148 -0.0045 0.0001 
  62.96 -23.38 -13.78 -4.24  0.41    -21.89 -14.43  -3.34  0.09 
Medium  0.1234 -0.0036 0.0007 -0.0036 0.0011    -0.0029 0.0001 -0.0030 0.0004 
  61.68  -4.14 0.70 -3.81 1.02    -3.21 0.09 -3.25 0.38 
High  0.1234 0.0238 0.0154 -0.0017 0.0022    0.0241 0.0157 -0.0014 0.0013 
  61.87 18.78 10.88 -1.33  1.49    17.56 10.13 -1.12  0.86 
High - Low  0.0003 0.0552 0.0295 0.0038 0.0017    0.0549 0.0304 0.0031 0.0012 
   0.89   20.79  2.43  1.15    26.85 21.49  1.97  0.77 
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Table 6: Characteristic Selectivity (CS) measure decomposition across Trade_PIN sorted fund 
deciles 
 
In each quarter and for each fund, we compute a trade_PIN variable by value-weighing the probability of 
information trading (PIN) of stocks traded by the fund during the quarter using the dollar values of the 
trade as weights. At the end of each quarter from 1983 to 2004, we sort all mutual funds in our sample 
into deciles according to their trade_PINs and decompose the Characteristic Selectivity (CS) measure 
within each decile. The CS measure and its component are reported in basis points (bp). t-values 
































All Funds  23.5 13.9 -1.8  14.2  3.6  8.8 
   1.91 1.19  -2.38 2.09 0.55 1.50 
Low   -2.9  -7.6  -0.4  3.4  -12.1  16.2 
  -0.29 -0.70 -0.20  0.42 -2.02  2.57 
2  11.4  10.4  -0.7 2.6 -6.4  8.9 
  0.92 0.87  -0.47 0.40 -0.93  1.28 
3  11.8  9.2  -1.0 5.5 -5.5  9.8 
  1.04 0.81  -0.69 0.88 -0.78  1.65 
4  10.3  8.3  -1.1 5.8 -3.5  6.0 
  1.01 0.76  -0.81 0.76 -0.54  0.89 
5 28.6  23.3  -2.3  6.4  2.5  5.5 
  2.17 1.80  -1.52 0.72 0.31 0.74 
6 31.9  19.2  -2.4  18.7  5.6  9.4 
  2.07 1.20  -1.52 1.69 0.62 1.10 
7 28.4  19.4  -0.9  17.2  9.7  0.2 
  1.52 1.17  -0.56 1.18 0.89 0.03 
8 30.9  14.6  -3.4  25.0  8.6  13.7 
  1.73 0.87  -2.05 2.26 0.84 1.64 
9 35.1  15.7  -2.7  26.6  16.8  7.6 
  1.75 0.82  -1.35 2.38 1.70 0.77 
High 50.0  26.5  -3.2 31.2  20.4  10.4 
   2.70 1.43  -1.40 2.83 2.25 1.37 
High - Low 
  
52.9 34.1 -2.8  27.8 32.5 -5.8 
2.87 1.94  -0.93 2.26 3.50  -0.68   49 
 
Table 7: Empirical validations of the Characteristics Selectivity (CS) decomposition 
 
Panel A reports type of mutual fund trades and the average order imbalances. For each fund in our sample, we examine changes in its holdings 
over two consecutive quarters and categorize them into four groups: (1) “Open” (defined as holdings increase from zero to positive); (2) “Close” 
(defined as holdings decrease from positive to zero); (3) “Increase” (defined as holdings increase but not from zero); and (4) “Decrease” (defined 
as holdings decrease, but not to zero). For each group, we report the average dollar holding change as a percentage of the total dollar holding 
change of the fund (computed using prices at quarter end), the average order-imbalance measure and the associated t-value. The average order-
imbalance measure is computed as the difference between total numbers of buyer-initiated shares bought and total numbers of seller-initiated 
shares sold, divided by total number of shares traded during the quarter; the resulting number is then cross-sectionally demeaned. The sampling 
period is from 1983 to 2004. 
 
Panel B provides two examples to illustrate the decomposition of the mutual fund stock selection skill. We decompose the mutual fund 
Characteristics Selectivity (CS) measure (Daniel et al., 1997) for DFA US Micro-Cap fund (FUNDNO=16500 in CDA/Spectrum S-12 mutual 
fund holding database) and Index funds a group (fund whose name contains any of the following: “INDEX,” “INDE,” “INDX,” “S&P,” “DOW 







O is the old component; CS
adj is an adjustment component due to fund inflows; CS
inf and CS
liq are the informed trading and liquidity 
provision components, respectively. The sampling period is from 1983 to 2004. t-values associated with the average measures are reported in 
italics. 
 
Panel C reports the percentage of total cross-sectional variation in the total “Characteristic Selectivity” (CS) measure (DGTW, 1997) explained by 
its four components: the old component (CS
O), the adjustment component (CS
adj), the informed trading component (CS
inf) and the liquidity 
provision component (CS
liq) in a variance decomposition framework outlined in the paper. We perform the variance decomposition on the full 
sample and on each style subsample. The t-values associated with the percentages are reported in italics, using the weighted least squares (WLS) 
method. The sampling period is from 1983 to 2004.  
 
Panel A: Type of mutual fund trades and average order imbalances 
 
trade type 
ALL     AGG     GROWTH     GNI 
% of all 
trades  oimb t-value 
  
% of all 
trades  oimb  t-value    % of all 
trades  oimb  t-value    % of all 
trades  oimb  t-value 
Open  30.6% 0.31%  4.09  34.5% 0.36%  3.19  31.2% 0.14%  1.61  27.7% 0.61%  7.21 
Close  26.7% -0.27% -4.73  30.8% -0.15% -1.32  27.4% -0.26% -3.63  24.0% -0.30% -3.75 
Increase  22.8% 0.48%  9.27  17.5% 0.48%  5.86  22.0% 0.55%  8.37  26.4% 0.37%  5.07 
Decrease  19.9%  1.27%  18.06    17.3%  1.69%  14.51    19.4%  1.34%  15.67    21.9%  0.84%  11.17   50 
 




























DFA US Micro-Cap:         
Alpha (bps)  36.1  19.3  -4.2  21.0  0.5  20.5 
t-value  1.72 0.89  -0.64  1.30  0.06  1.84 
Index Funds:             
Alpha (bps)  0.0  24.9  3.2  -28.1  -34.6  6.4 
t-value  0.00 0.93  0.50  -1.11 -2.19  0.36 
 

















56.8% -2.5% 37.2% 8.4% 
127.2 -15.3 120.9 24.4 
    
Aggressive Growth (AGG) 
52.1% -1.0% 44.9% 4.0% 
44.7 -2.7 55.2 4.2 
    
Growth (Growth) 
55.7% -3.0% 37.0% 10.2% 
96.0 -14.9 95.0 22.3 
    
Growth and Income (GNI) 
54.1% -2.2% 37.0% 11.1% 
56.8 -5.4 55.9 16.6 
 